Document Type : Original Article
1 PhD Student, Department of Jurisprudence and Islamic Law, Islamic Azad University of Isfahan (Khorasgan), Isfahan, Iran Branch
2 Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Islamic Law, University of Tehran
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Islamic Law, Islamic Azad University of Isfahan (Khorasgan), Isfahan, Iran
Article Title [Persian]
تقیه به معنای ابراز یا کتمان عقیده و عمل برخلاف نظر قلبى خود براى اجتناب از ضرر دینى یا دنیایى یکی از موضوعات فقهی است که دارای پیامدهای تربیتی است. هدف پژوهش حاضر ، بررسی تقیه به عنوان یک روش رفتاری در تربیت اسلامی ازطریق تطبیق نظرات موافق ومخالف از دو جنبه فقهی و تربیتی است. روش تحقیق حاضر ، تطبیقی کیفی با رویکرد تحلیلی – استنباطی است . محققان برای جمع آوری داده ها از روش کتابخانه ای شامل بررسی منابع اولیه ومنابع ثانویه و برای تحلیل داده ها از روش تحلیل کیفی مبتنی بر ثبت داده ها و تعیین مقوله ها بر اساس واحد " موضوع " سود جسته اند. یافته های تحقیق در بعُد فقهی نشان می دهد که فقیهان شیعه عمدتا طرفدار تقیه و علمای اهل تسنن با آن مخالف بوده اند. عمده ترین وجه تشابه موافقان ومخالفان تقیه ، توسل هر دو گروه به آیات قرآن و رفتار پیامبر و صحابه او ازطریق ارائه تفاسیر متفاوت است. یافته دیگر تحقیق نشان می دهد که از نظر موافقان ، در بسیاری از امور زندگی لزومی به مراجعه به تقیه نیست و نمی توان آن را به عنوان یک اصل رفتاری دائم مورد رجوع قرار داد. از نظر مخالفان تقیه ، در جهان معاصر و با توجه به تحولات جدید مبتنی بر رواج مکانیزم های قانونی در جامعه ، توسل به تقیه ضرورتی ندارد. وجه تشابه بین دو گروه موافقان ومخالفان تقیه ، توجه به تحولات مثبت همچون حقوق شهروندی وتحولات منفی همچون افزایش افراطی گری های مذهبی برای پذیرش یا رد تقیه است.
Despite The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970s, in addition to changing the political system greatly affected the educational system. In the Pahlavi regime, the main goal of the educational system was to rise the young generation with an emphasis on three identities: Iranian, Western and Islamic. Of course, the programs and plans of the educational system and the content of textbooks mainly emphasized the identity of pre-Islamic Iran (Tamer, 2010). The government also welcomed Western educational models such as France, Britain, and the United States, while not emphasizing Islamic identity. The new political system changed this situation. Emphasis on Western identity was generally removed from the activities and programs of the educational system (Rabiei, Fayyaz, Mahrouzade, Bakhtiari, & Khorsandi Taskooh, 2019). Also, the emphasis on Iranian identity in the macro policies of the education system was reduced and Islamic identity was strongly considered in the upstream documents of the Ministry of Education. In support of this policy, "Western education" was also rejected as a souvenir of the monarchy and instead of that the emphasis was placed on the implementation of "Islamic education" (Arjmand 2017). Thus, during the last four decades, dozens of books, articles, journals, conferences and meetings were held in various Iran’s universities and scientific meetings to explain the dimensions and characteristics of Islamic education and also to be aware of its response to the problems and challenges of the young generation.
During the 1980-1990s, most of these topics were related to issues such as the psychological characteristics of the child from the perspective of Islam, the duties of parents, the characteristics of the Muslim teacher, teaching the Qur'an and Islamic teachings to the younger generation, Islamic educational philosophy, marriage in Islam and comparing Islamic views with Western schools of philosophy and psychology (such as existentialism, realism, idealism, behaviorism, Gestaltism) (Sharifani & Qomi 2010; Farajzadeh & Sarmadi, 2019; Nedayi, 1995; Amini & Khalaflo, 2018). With the beginning of the new millennium and global changes - such as the growth of religious extremism, information and communication technologies, literacy in society and increasing the presence of women in social arenas - new issues and questions were raised that Islamic education had to answer. For example, puberty, gender equality (in cases such as hijab, permission to travel abroad, inheritance, marriage, and retribution), and citizenship rights (Eaglagi, 2009).
Indeed, in societies where religion does not interfere with the educational system, these responses and relationships, principles, and “behavioral do's and don'ts" are determined by citizenship-based frameworks or legal mechanisms (Nikolista-Winter, Werner & Maalouf, 2019). In these societies, behavioral frameworks and standards do not depend on personal judgments or religious beliefs. On the contrary, in Iran, it is the religious-political system that must respond to new issues and challenges and its interpretations.
Thus, over the past four decades, the policymakers of the educational system of the Islamic Republic have tried to examine and revise the components of this system in order to educate the young Muslim generation. In this regard, some reforms were implemented quickly, such as methods of hiring teachers, extracurricular activities and the content of school textbooks. But reform in the components of the education system did not necessarily mean change in learners’ behavior, especially in complex areas such as value education. Two main reasons can be given for this: First, change in individual and social behaviors is not easy; and second, new situations and challenges often arise that require new answers. One of the new topics is teaching values to the young generation and observing such things as honesty, openness, humility, loyalty, fairness, generosity, tolerance, and confidentiality in individual and social behavior based on Islamic thought and education. On the one hand, Islamic education places great emphasis on teaching moral values and practicing them, and agrees with the idea that values are absolute and beyond time and space, and opposes moral relativism (Sajadi 2000; Salavati 2016; Garai & Hosseinzadeh Yazdi, 2016). On the other hand, in today's changing world, it seems that society needs to offer new interpretations of values.
One of the new issues in the field of value education is the teaching of the value of "truthfulness" and its interpretation according to a jurisprudential principle namely "Taqiyyah". There are two questions here: Is truthfulness absolutely and always a value, and should we always tell the truth to people (Iranian or foreign) who are not Shi'a? The answer to these two questions requires explaining the relationship between the value of truthfulness and the jurisprudential principle of Taqiyyah. In fact, while telling the truth as an undeniable value is taught to the young generation, at the same time according to taqiyyah permission is given not to tell the truth according to the time and place. It is natural that in this case a young student may have an intellectual conflict over how, one can believe in both truthfulness and not telling the truth at the same time ; how to create unity between these two in daily life and practical behavior, and finally how to distinguish when to be honest and when to ignore it. To answer these questions, it is necessary to become more familiar with the concept of "Taqiyyah".
Taqiyyah literally means to protect, avoid and beware (Ibn Manzoor, 1993). Also, according to Shiite jurists, taqiyyah is the expression or concealment of a belief and action contrary to one's heart's opinion in order to avoid religious or worldly harm (Sheikh Mufid, 1992). There are two types of taqiyyah: one is the taqiyyah of fear which is done to repel harm and eliminate fear and the other is taqiyyah based on tolerance or admiration which is done in order to attract the opinion of the opponents and even cooperate with them in common goals (Makarem Shirazi, 1990). In terms of practice, there are two types of taqiyyah: Denial taqiyyah and verbal taqiyyah. Denial taqiyyah means to cover up and hide one's belief and religion from others and verbal taqiyyah is to express one's opinion contrary to own belief or religion (Safari, 2002). In addition, according to the type of ruling, taqiyyah is divided into five types: Farḍ (Arabic: فرض), Mustahabb (Arabic: مُسْتَحَبّ), Mubah (Arabic: مباح) , makruh (Arabic: مکروه), Haram ( Arabic: حَرَام )(Makarem Shirazi, 1990).
In fact, whenever telling the truth is dangerous for a person life or has no benefit, taqiyyah is obligatory (Sheikh Mufid, 1992). A Mustahabb taqiyyah is when there is a weak possibility of harm in the future. Taqiyyah is permissible in cases where the relief from harm or its occurrence is the same from the point of view of the Shari'ah. Makruh taqiyyah is that not doing it and enduring harm is preferable from the point of view of the Shari'a (Sheikh Ansari, 1413). Haram taqiyyah is in the case where performing taqiyyah promotes falsehood and misleads people and strengthens oppression. According to what has been said, taqiyyah means temporarily abandoning some of the rules of Sharia or concealing certain religious beliefs in an exceptional and special circumstances - such as fear of oppressive rulers or tolerance of other Islamic sects or association with public opinion - provided that there is a rational reason for the protection of important religious and worldly interests or protection of lives, property and reputation of Muslims (Makarem Shirazi, 1990). Taqiyyah is a protective shield for the believer in order to be safe from the enemy's aggression and to protect himself from dangers such as imprisonment, exile, murder and deprivation of legal rights (Safari, 2002). Proponents of Taqiyyah - who are mainly followers of Shiism and Imami jurisprudence - believe that Islam’s thoughts and ideas are based on rationality and in accordance with human nature. In life, sometimes due to the existence of different beliefs and tastes, a person is forced to say or do something contrary to her/his heart belief to save life or other interests. Islam has recommended this behavior to its followers by observing special rules and conditions. Considering what has been said and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the educational system and its support for Imami jurisprudence, now the question arises whether taqiyyah can be taught - as a behavioral method- to children and youth - as tomorrow's generation - to use it in society. According to this goal, the sub-objectives of the research are:
The method of study was a qualitatively comparative with an analytical-inferential approach. Researchers have used the library method to collect data, including primary and secondary sources. The research population included articles and books and sample was selected through availability sampling method (n = 57). Also, for data analysis, the method of qualitative content analysis was used based on data recording and determine categories applying unit of "subject" in two aspects of jurisprudence / education. Qualitative content analysis follows the nature of flexible, spiral or non-linear, creative and without special format (Mohammadpour, 2013). However, the content analysis was done in three stages as follows: First, by reviewing jurisprudential books and articles, the sources were determined based on the keywords related to taqiyyah. The data were then extracted, classified and summarized. In the third stage, after classification of data by subject, they were studied analytically-inferentially in two groups of jurisprudence and education.
Analysis of the content of the studied sources shows that among the major sects of Islam, Shiites believe in taqiyyah more. For this reason, among the jurisprudential issues that have existed for centuries between the proponents and opponents of taqiyyah, Shiite scholars can be considered as agreeing with taqiyyah and Sunni jurists as opposed to it (Fouzan, 2001). According to this short explanation and research questions, first the results of the jurisprudential analysis for and against taqiyyah are presented. Then, taqiyyah’s educational analysis is mentioned as a behavioral method and the reasons for and against it to teach it to the young generation in the contemporary era:
First) Jurisprudential reasons of taqiyyah’s proponents
Many Shiite jurists consider the verses of the Qur'an, hadiths related to the 12 Shiite Imams and examples related to historical events to be the most important reasons for accepting taqiyyah (Ameli, 1998; Sheikh Mufid, 1992). It is natural that the verses of the Qur'an are the most important guide and reference in the life of every Muslim. According to Shiite scholars, taqiyyah is one of the Qur'anic concepts that has been mentioned in several suras (for example, verse 106 of Surah Nakhl, verse 28 of Surah Al-Imran, verse 28 of Surah Ghafir, verse 20 of Surah Qasas). These verses have clear references to the cases in which the believer seeks refuge in taqiyyah in critical situations in order to preserve his life, property and reputation or that of others. In addition, Shiite scholars refer to historical events mentioned in the Qur'an, such as the story of the salvation of Prophet Moses (pbuh) (Surah Qasas, verse 20), Prophet Ibrahim's treatment of polytheists (Surah An'am, verses 76 and 80) and torture of Ammar ibn Yasir by the enemies of the Prophet of Islam (Surah An-Nahl, verse 106) as the reason for the approval of Taqiyyah.
According to Shiite jurists, documenting the legitimacy of taqiyyah in addition to Qur'anic arguments is the rule of reason. There is no doubt that expressing the correct belief and propagating it is of great value and has been the mission of all divine prophets, but if the expression of that belief does not bring significant benefit or is accompanied by possible harm - material or spiritual - the human intellect rules to hide it (Mariuma, 2014). Therefore, concealing an opinion or speaking against one's own opinion is not retreating and falling short in the face of falsehood, because the intellect considers it obligatory to avoid harming life, honor and property (Sobhani, 2010). Safari (2002) believes that taqiyyah is one of the natural instincts in which animals also share with humans, so that some animals - when see danger - hide their truth. For example, they paint themselves in the color of the environment so as not to be exposed to death.
One of the most important reasons for the acceptance of taqiyyah by Shiites has been the fear of losing their lives, family and friends. In fact, the history of Islam shows that the Shiites - as a religious minority - have practiced more taqiyyah than any other Islamic sect, mainly due to political pressures and to preserve their religious beliefs (Waqas 2016). Taqiyyah is the motto of every weak human being who has been deprived of his freedom. History shows that during the rule of the Umayyad dynasties, the Abbasids and in a large part of the Ottoman Empire, the Shiites were persecuted (Winter, 2010; Shuriye, 2016; Brooks, 2017). Also, since the Shiites have disagreed with other Islamic sects on an important part of religious principles and many jurisprudential rulings, they have often been forced to conceal their habits and beliefs in order to avoid life and financial dangers (Karimi, 2019). They have also tried to strengthen their friendship and brotherhood with other Muslims by resorting to Taqiyyah (Sobhani, 2010).
Some Shiite jurists believe that taqiyyah is the weapon of the men without power against the oppressor man and oppressive governments. Taqiyyah is the weapon of human beings who have been caught by dictators who attack the lives, property and reputation of mankind only because they do not agree with them on certain beliefs and ideological principles (Akbari, Mortazavi & Akrami, 2019). Taqiyyah is used only by those who do not have freedom in their speech, actions and beliefs. In such a situation, individuals are saved if they are either forced to remain silent or pretend to agree with the oppressors (Soltani, 2003). This is true in many countries of the world - especially most Muslim countries - which have dictatorial and repressive governments.
Second) Jurisprudential reasons of the opponents of taqiyyah
Opponents believe that taqiyyah means saying something in tongue that one does not believe in the heart, and this is a lie that is highly condemned in Islam. Sunnis consider taqiyyah as a form of hypocrisy and condemn it, and for this reason they always object to the Shiites (Dalkilic, 2007). At the same time, Shiite jurists, citing some Sunni books, point out that some of Sunni jurists also consider taqiyyah permissible in some cases.
After the death of the Prophet of Islam, there was a serious disagreement among Muslims regarding the appointment of his successor. Sunnis believe in the legitimacy of first three caliphs namely Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman - all of whom had family ties to the Prophet Mohammad (Amir-Moezzi, 1994). On the contrary, Shiites believe that the Prophet of Islam chose his son-in-law Ali as successor after his death. However, after the death of three caliphs, the Muslims elected Ali as the fourth caliph. These historical events have been the source of discord between the two groups of Shiite and Sunni jurists for more than 1,400 years in the affirmation or rejection of many religious rulings, including Taqiyyah. For example, Sunni jurists believe that Ali's silence for 15 years and his acceptance of the caliphate of the three before himself is legitimacy proof these three caliphs, while Shiite jurists consider Ali's silence as a taqiyyah to avoid creating of separation among Muslims (see Ibn Jawzi, 1966, Yaqubi, 1981; Seyyed Razi, 1981; Safari, 2002; Sheikh Mufid, 1992).
There are several verses in the Qur'an about jihad and martyrdom in the way of God. The Prophet of Islam also spoke about the high status of the martyrs and the virtue of jihad. Sunni jurists, referring to these cases as well as historical events that are approved by the Shiites - such as the martyrdom of Hajar ibn Uday, Omar Khazaei, and Meysam Tamar in the fight against the Umayyad caliphs - believe that Taqiyyah is not permissible. According to them, propagating taqiyyah can mean denying jihad and martyrdom against the enemies of Islam. One of the famous Shiite jurists, Klini (1986), in response to this doubt, believes that taqiyyah is not always obligatory, but has five obligatory states. Also, some Shiite jurists have considered the struggle of these people against the oppressive Umayyad government permissible and taqiyyah forbidden in those circumstances (Kashif al-Ghatta', 1992).
Third) Educational reasons in favor of taqiyyah
First of all, it is necessary to determine the purpose of educational reasons for readers. For educational reasons, we mean logical and rational causes and arguments that can be approved by all educational systems in teaching values, regardless of religious and cultural differences. Based on this, taqiyyah can be examined from several aspects:
Fourth) Educational reasons against taqiyyah
The most important reasons given by the opponents of taqiyyah in terms of education are:
The victory of the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran greatly affected all social systems - especially the educational system. New politicians who support Imami and Shiite jurisprudence have tried for the last four decades to replace Islamic education with Western or national-oriented education. Also, the Islamic education system, with emphasis on jurisprudence, tries to interpret the behavioral frameworks of the young generation in the form of five rules of lawful, unlawful, recommended, disliked and permissible, and "educational do's and don'ts". But achieving this goal faces two challenges: First, Iran is not a religiously integrated society, and second, the impact of new developments and, of course, the emergence of new issues and challenges make the need to re-examine religious rulings inevitable. The aim of this study, considering these two challenges, was to look again at the jurisprudential issue of "Taqiyyah" - as a challenging issue in the field of teaching values to the young generation - from the perspective of its proponents and opponents. Since the present researchers are the first to try to examine "taqiyyah" as a behavioral method in the field of education, they have found it difficult to find much supportive research. This limitation of research cannot be denied.
Due to this limitation, the first research finding shows that religiously, "Taqiyyah" is one of the disputed issues between Shiites and Sunnis, and over the centuries, various jurists have tried to find reasons for or against it. It is clear that present researchers are not in a position to side with a group. What can be said is that both groups, in expressing their views - and the evidence they present - resort to facts that common sense can hardly oppose. The second important finding of the research is that according to Shiite jurists, taqiyyah is mainly limited to very specific cases - such as the fear of losing lives and property in political or religious emergencies - and of course it can not be used as a "behavioral method" in a comprehensive sense. For this reason, Shiite jurists have explained the types of taqiyyah to show that it is an exceptional behavior in very exceptional situations.
The third finding of the research indicates the acceptance of the realities of today's world by both groups of proponents and opponents of Taqiyyah. On the one hand, we can not ignore the fact that in many countries of the world, human freedoms and human rights are ignored. This bitter reality is more evident in the Middle East than in any other part of the world. For this reason, taqiyyah - for both proponents and opponents - is one of the best and most effective tools for countering authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. From this perspective, the teaching of taqiyyah to children and youth should be considered by parents and teachers. The present researchers do not make this recommendation to policymakers and educational planners because they, as "people in power", will definitely oppose Taqiyyah education. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that education systems can help protect human rights through better citizenship education and the education of a an active generation. Accordingly, taqiyyah education can not be considered the most important priority in value education. In a general conclusion, it can be said that according to Shiite jurists, taqiyyah is not a fixed matter and depends on specific time and place conditions. Also, taqiyyah has been used throughout Shiite history - as a religious minority - mainly when there was no democracy and they could not exercise their citizenship and religious rights. Thus, taqiyyah is primarily a political reaction rather than a behavioral method. It is clear that the change of authoritarian regimes and the expansion of democracy will make the revision of the concept of taqiyyah and its scope of application inevitable for Shiite jurists and educators. According to the research findings, it is suggested that Muslim educators emphasize the concept of taqiyyah - meaning tolerance of opposing beliefs and self-control and consider taqiyyah education as a behavioral method from this perspective.