One of the central problems in moral philosophy is the gap between moral judgment and moral action: knowing what is right does not always result in acting accordingly. In classical philosophy, this problem was mainly explained by weakness of will or inadequate moral education. Postmodernism, however, redefines it as a deeper structural issue within axiology. Although postmodernism is not the newest trend in Western philosophy, it remains highly relevant for understanding contemporary moral crises because it challenges the epistemic and evaluative foundations of modernity. Through its rejection of metanarratives, commitment to anti-foundationalism and relativism, emphasis on power relations, and weakening of the unified subject, postmodernism unsettles the grounds of morality and loosens the bond between moral understanding and moral practice.

This study seeks to clarify the axiological roots of the gap between moral judgment and action in postmodern thought and to explore the theoretical potential of the concept of the “transcendent self” in Hasan-Zadeh Amoli’s philosophy as an alternative foundation for moral education. Using an analytical-comparative and critical approach based on qualitative content analysis, the study first examines the axiological assumptions of postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida, then explains Amoli’s concept of the transcendent self, and finally compares the two perspectives.

The findings show that despite some shared criticism of formalistic ethics, the two approaches differ profoundly in their value foundations.